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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
VINCENT DYKES, by and through
Neil Farrell Dykes, his Guardian Ad
Litem,

1

Plaintiff,

vs.
RELIABLE FURNITURE & CARPET
COMPANY,

Case No.

Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff and Respondent,

8179

vs.
WALKER MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Third-Party Defendant and Appellant.

J

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For convenience in referring to the parties in this case,
they will be referred to herein the same as they are designated in the pleadings filed in the lower court.
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The plaintiff, a minor, commenced an action by his
guardian ad litem, in the District Court of Weber County,
State of Utah, to recover judgment against the defendant.
Reliable Furniture & CarpetCompany, defendant and thirdparty plaintiff, for personal injuries alleged to have been
sustained by plaintiff in falling from a baby crib which
was purchased by plaintiff's parents from said defendant,
a retail furniture n1erchant engaged in business at Ogden,
Utah. Plaintiff's complaint alleges· that the catch mechanism on the gate of the crib was defective and: "That the
defendant was negligent in failing to inspect, discover and
remedy said defects in said crib mechanism, and that said
negligence was the proximate cause of said child's fall and
injury." The third-party defendant, Walker Manufacturing
Company, is not a party to said action brought by plaintiff
against said defendant. ( R. 2) .
Subsequent to the filing of said complaint, said defendant, as third-party plaintiff, filed a third-party complaint against Walker Manufacturing Company, as thirdparty defendant, in which it is alleged that if said crib was
defective as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, such defect
was proximately caused by said third-party defendant in
the manner in which said crib was designed or manufactured; and said third-party complaint demands judgment
against third-party defendant in the amount of any judgment which may be recovered by plaintiff against thirdparty plaintiff. (R. 4). Summons was issued on said thirdparty complaint and purported service thereof was made
in Salt Lake County, Utah, on a person named Harland
Fredrickson. (R. 7).
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Third-party defendant filed a motion in this case, as
authorized by Rule 12 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and in the form prescribed thereby, whereby thirdparty defendant moved the district court as follows :

iQ[\

"To dismiss the third-party action or in lieu
thereof to quash the return of service of the thirdparty summons on the grounds (a) that the court
lacks jurisdiction over the person of said thirdparty defendant, and (b) that said third-party defendant has not been properly served with process
in this action, all of which 'more clearly appears in
the affidavits of Sam Walker and Harland Fredrickson hereto annexed as Exhibit "A" and Exhibit
"B", respectively.
C. E. Henderson
of Ray, Rawlins, Jones & Henderson
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant,
Walker 1\'Ianufacturing Company." (R. 8).

·~·

t.

Said motion of third-party defendant came on regularly
for hearing on October 13, 1953, before the Honorable John
A. Hendricks, one of the judges of said district court and,
following the arguments of counsel, the matter was taken
under advisement. In support of said motion, affidavits
of Sam \Valker (owner and proprietor of Walker Manufacturing Company) and Harland Fredrickson, marked
Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B", respectively, were annexed
to and filed with said motion. (R. 8). The deposition of
Harland Fredrickson, on behalf of third-party plaintiff,
was taken pursuant to stipulation of counsel for thirdparty plaintiff and third-party defendant and the original
transcript thereof was submitted to and filed in said district
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court. (R. 10). For convenience, the transcript .of said
deposition, which is designated in the record as 010, will be
hereinbelow designated as "Tr".
On or about March 31, 1954, said district court made
and entered the following order :
"Minute Entry
Ogden, Utah
March 31st, 1954

n~

"!

Gentlemen:

i~l

Re; Civil file #28090 Vincent Dykes et-al vs
Reliable Furniture and Carpet Co., Defendant, and
Walker Manufacturing Co third party defendant,
the motion to dismiss was argued by Mr. Henderson
and taken under advisement, on the First day of
March The Court denied the Third Party Motion,
and no notice was given.
The Court at this time grants the Third Party defendant 10 days from this date to file an answer.
Lawrence M. Malen, County Clerk
A. M. Allen, Deputy." (R. 9).
A copy of said order, which was the only order entered
with respect to said motion of third-party defendant, was
received by counsel for third-party defendant, on April 1.
1954.
Walker Manufacturing Company is the trade name by
which Sam Walker, who is a resident of the State of California, carries on business in said state at the City of Burbank. (R. 8-Exhibit "A"). Said third-party defendant
has never been a resident of the State of Utah and has
not been served with summons in this action unless the
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purported service in Salt Lake County on Harland Fredrickson be held a valid service on said third-party defendant. At all times herein involved, third-party defendant
carried on the business of manufacturing infant furniture
at Burbank, California, and had no place of business, no
office, no plant, facilities or equipment, no bank accounts,
no records, no merchandise or samples of its products and
no property of any kind in the State of Utah. (R. 8-Exhibit
"A", R. 10-Tr. 4, 5, 17, 38, 41, 45-47). Third-party defendant has no employees, no telephone or directory listing,
and did no advertising in Utah. (R. 10-Tr. 4, 5, 13, 38-39,
45).
Harland Fredrickson, upon whom said purported service of summons was made, was, at all times herein mentioned, an independent contractor who maintained his place
of business in Salt Lake County, Utah, at his own expense.
His business, which he characterizes as a manufacturers'
representative, involved the solicitation of orders for products of various manufacturers, including those of thirdparty defendant. When he obtained an order, he forwarded
it to the manufacturer for acceptance and if accepted by
the manufacturer, the goods covered by the order were
shipped by the manufacturer direct to the purchaser who
made payment therefor direct to the manufacturer. If an
order for goods was accepted by the manufacturer and
shipped to the purchaser and the purchaser accepted and
paid for the goods. Harland Fredrickson received a commission for his services in obtaining such order. (R. 8Exhibit "B", R. 10-Tr. 17-20, 25-26, 34-36, 40-42, 47-48).
He handled no merchandise and had no authority to negotiate with respect to the price or terms of payment for. goods
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ordered, nor to pass on the credit risk of a customer or make
adjustments on goods ordered and shipped. (R. 8-Exhibit
"A", Exhibit "B", R. 10, Tr. 13-15, 18-20, 22-25, 31, 34-37,
40-46).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The District Court of Weber County erred in denying the motion of third-party defendant to dismiss the
third-party action because the record shows that said court
lacks jurisdiction over the person of said third-party defendant and that the purported service of summons in said
action is null and void.

I

I

I~

2. Said third-party complaint states no claim and
presents no issue upon which relief could be granted against
said third-party defendant in favor of said third-party
plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT TO DISMISS
THE THIRD-PARTY ACTION BECAUSE THE
RECORD SHOWS THAT SAID COURT LACKS
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF SAID
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT AND THAT
THE PURPORTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS
IN SAID ACTION IS NULL AND VOID.
To sustain the purported service of summons in the
third-party action, third-party plaintiff relies, and must
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rely on Rule 4 (e) (10) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides for service :
"Upon a natural person, nonresident of the
State of Utah, doing business in this State at one
or more places of business, as set forth in Rule
17 (e), by deliverii_lg a copy thereof to the defendant
personally or to one of his managers, superintendents or agents."
Rule 17(e) which is referred to in Rule 4(e) (10) provides
as follows:
"Action Against a Non-resident doing Business
in this State. When a non-resident person is associated in and conducts business within the State of
Utah in one or more places in his own name or a
common trade name, and said business is conducted
under the supervision of a manager, superintendent,
or agent, said person may be sued in his own name
in any action arising out of the conduct of said
business."
We respectfully submit that such purported service was null
and void and of no force and effect because it is established
by the record in this case that third-party defendant, a nonresident of the State of Utah, was not doing business in
this state at any place of business within this state at the
times herein involved, or for that matter at any other times,
and that such purported service was not made on a manager,
superintendent or agent of said third-party defendant.
Parke, Davis & Co. vs. Fifth Judicial District Court in and
for Beaver County et al., 93 Utah 217, 72 P. (2d) 466;
McGriff vs. Charles Antell, Inc. (Utah), 256 P. (2d) 703;
10 A. L. R. (2d) pages 200-203.
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In Parke, Davis & Co. vs. Fifth Judicial District Court
in and for Beaver County et al., (supra), this court states
the facts and holding of said case as follows :
"The cause is before us on petition of plaintiff
and the demurrer of defendants. McLennan was a
traveling salesman for Parke, Davis & Co. in Utah.
Such orders as he obtained were sent to the branch
office of the company at Kansas City and, if accepted, the goods were shipped direct to the purchasers in interstate commerce. McLennan was not
an officer of the company. He handled no merchandise, and all orders solicited by him were on credit
to be approved and extended by the credit manager
at Kansas City. The salesman had no authority to
extend credit to any one. The corporation was not
otherwise in business in Utah, had no office or place
of business, and owned no property in the state. It
had never applied for permission to do business in
the state, had done no business therein, and had
designated no person within the state upon whom
process might be served.
" ( 1) This court has held that the soliciting of
orders for goods by an agent of a foreign corporation and shipment of goods pursuant to such order
by such corporation of another state directly to the
purchaser is in interstate commerce and does not
constitute doing business within the state so as to
subject the corporation to the statute prescribing
conditions applicable to foreign corporations doing
business within the state. Advance-Rumely Thresher
Co., Inc., v. Stohl, 75 Utah 124, 283 P. 731. It is a
general rule that : 'The mere soliciting and obtaining of orders within a state by the agent of a foreign corporation, for goods to be shipped into the
state to the purchasers, do not amount to doing business within the state so as to render the corporation
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amenable to service of process therein.' Note, 101
A. L. R. 133; People's Tobacco Co., Ltd., v. American
Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed.
587, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 537; Curlee Clothing Co. v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm. (Okl. Sup.) 68 P. (2d) · 834."
POINT NO.2
SAID THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT STATES
NO CLAIM AND PRESENTS NO ISSUE UPON
WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED
AGAINST SAID THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT
IN FAVOR OF SAID THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF.
It. is now established by a recent decision of this court
that said third-party complaint should be dismissed on the
ground that said third-party complaint states no claim and
presents no issue upon which relief could be granted against
third-party defendant in favor of third-party plaintiff.

;:

Plaintiff's complaint, to which third-party defendant
is not a party, alleges as follows:
"3. That late in January, 1953, the parents of
said child at Ogden, Utah, went to the defendant's
store for the purpose of buying a baby crib. That
Raymone Labrecque, said defendant's salesman,
showed them cribs and demonstrated one of the
same make as the one selected by said parents. That
the defendant's salesman, in demonstrating said
crib, had difficulty in making the gate of said crib
catch and tried several times before he was able to
do so. That the parents of said child selected a crib
similar to the one demonstrated but informed the
defendant that they would not accept that one be-
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cause of the difficulty with the catch, whereupon
the salesman assured them that the particular crib
was only for display purposes and that they were
to be sent a different crib, but of the same make
which would be free from defects. Whereupon the
parents purchased a crib and the defendant's employee subsequently delivered and assembled the
same at the parent's house for use by said child.
That said delivered crib was likewise defective in
that the catch or locking mechanism which held the
gate in the raise position was improperly manufactured and assembled.

1 ~ru

Ill~

"4. That the parents of said child placed him
in the crib the night of February 21, 1953, and
raised the gate until it was held in the raised position, but because of the defect in the construction of
the catch mechanism said gate fell, permitting said
child to fall from said crib to a cement floor, where
he suffered a fractured skull.
"5. That the defendant was negligent in failing to inspect, discover and remedy said defects in
said crib mechanism, and that said negligence was
the proximate cause of said child's fall and injury."
The third-party complaint demands judgment against
third-party defendant only in the event plaintiff recovers
judgment against third-party plaintiff and, in support
thereof said third-party complaint alleges:
"That if said crib was defective as alleged in
'Exhibit C', such was proximately caused by the
third party defendant in the manner in which said
crib was designed or manufactured, and if the plaintiff obtains judgment or any part thereof, against
the third party plaintiff, then said third party defendant is liable to the said third party plaintiff
for the amount of said judgment."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~;

11
In Hardman vs. Mathews, et al., 262 P. (2d) 748,
which was decided by this court on November 2, 1953,
Justice Henroid, speaking for the court, held :
"If the negligence of the interpleaded parties
were the sole proximate cause of the injuries as defendants maintain, the latter would have a complete
defense to the action without the joinder. If actively
they were jointly or concurrently negligent with defendants, joinder would avail the latter nothing
since contribution cannot be had between joint or
concurring tort-feasors, in a case like this, unless
sanctioned by statute, there being none such in
Utah."

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court erred
in denying the motion of third-party defendant to dismiss
said third-party action because said court did not acquire
jurisdiction over third-party defendant by the purported
service of summons in Salt Lake County, Utah, on said
Harland Fredrickson. The material facts shown by the
record establish that third-party defendant, at all times
herein involved, was a nonresident of the State of Utah.
that he was not doing business in this state at any place of
business in this state, and that Harland Fredrickson was
an independent contractor who maintained his own place
of business in Utah at his own expense and was not a manager, superintendent, or agent of third-party defendant.

Furthermore, it is now clear under a decision of this
court, Hardman vs. Mathews (supra), decided during the
pendency of the present case in the lower court, that the
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third-party complaint filed against third-party defendant
states no claim and could present no issue upon which relief could be granted against third-party defendant in favor
of third-party plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,

C. E. HENDERSON,
of
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES,
. & HENDERSON,
Attorneys for Third-Party
Defendant and Appellant.
1011 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Ptah.
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